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Abstract
We model the provision of owner-occupied versus rental housing services as a competitive
search economy where households have private information over their expected duration.
Owning solves the private information problem at the cost of double search. With public
information, households with low vacancy hazard rates pay lower rents and search in thicker
markets. With private information, housing is under-provided to long-duration households
to discourage short-duration households from searching there. If a household has a high
enough expected duration, rental distortions become large enough that she prefers to own.
Customizing a house ameliorates the information problem while rent control exacerbates it.
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1 Introduction
There is a long list of plausible frictions that may create meaningful dierences in the value of
owning versus renting a home to a household. Many of the frictions that favor renting, such as
the higher transactions costs of buying and selling a house and the downpayment constraints
in the mortgage market, appear in one form or another in nearly all life cycle models with a
homeownership choice1.
However, there is little consensus on the frictions that favor owning. Tax wedges may oer
one motive for owning (as in Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2008); Gervais (2002)). Other, more
"fundamental," frictions used in models include a user cost premium of renting over owning,
perhaps due to excessive utilization of housing services on the part of renters (as in Henderson
and Ioannides (1983)), amplications to the perceived volatility of rents (Berkovec and Fullerton
(1992)), a housing ladder with only owner-occupied housing on the top rungs (Ortalo-Magne
and Rady (2006); Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (2007)), and a warm glow to owning (Iacoviello
and Pavan (2009); Kiyotaki et al. (2008)).2 While "intuitive", it is not yet clear what the size
and ultimate source of these various frictions are. Most, like dierential housing supply and
warm glows, are likely equilibrium outcomes rather than inputs.
In this paper, we build a model of endogenous dierential housing supply, where the equi-
librium outcome is dierential housing supply: owner-occupied housing is only oered in some
(sub)markets while rental housing is only oered in others. Later, by including an option to
customize a house in an extension to the model, we show that the economy can endogenously
give rise to "warm glows:" a higher ow utility from living in an otherwise identical (to the
econometrician) owner-occupied house.
Since owning and renting are just labels for dierent (perhaps many dierent) contracts to
provide housing services, we model the homeownership decision and the properties of rental
contracts as an outcome of a contracting problem. In the baseline model, houses are ex-ante
identical and households dier only according to their expected duration of search, which may
be private information. Homeowners (which may be households or landlords) post contracts for
housing services which specify a (potentially duration-dependent) price for housing services as
well as whether, after eventual separation, the current owner or the future occupant is responsible
for nding the next tenant (a "rental" or "owning" contract, respectively).
Within the housing market in this economy, households can direct their search to a specic
1e.g. Campbell and Cocco (2007); Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2009a,b); Cocco (2005); Diaz and
Luengo-Prado (2008); Fisher and Gervais (2007); Gervais (2002); Amior and Halket (2011); Iacoviello and Pavan
(2009); Kiyotaki, Michaelides and Nikolov (2008); Li and Yao (2007); Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (2008)
2One class of frictions that may work both ways is risk in the housing market, as in Sinai and Souleles (2005).
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type of contract (so that each type of contract is its own submarket) and are bilaterally matched
to houses within that submarket subject to the frictions from competitive search theory (Moen
(1997) and Shimer (1996)). In equilibrium, vacancies in a particular submarket adjusts so that
the expected return to adding a new house in any submarket is the same.
The lone ex-ante dierence in households in our economy is their expected duration in a
house. There is a long literature looking at mobility and homeownership choices. Deng, Gabriel
and Nothaft (2003) and Gabriel and Nothaft (2001) nd considerable variation across households
and Metropolitan Statistical Areas in rental vacancy rates and durations. Boehm, Herzog Jr.
and Schlottmann (1991), Cameron and Tracy (1997), Haurin and Gill (2002) and Kan (2000)
all nd relationships between mobility hazards and homeownership.
We also are following a growing literature by looking at housing in a search or matching
framework (e.g. Albrecht, Anderson, Smith and Vroman (2007); Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman
(2010); Caplin and Leahy (2008); Ngai and Tenreyro (2009); Piazzesi and Schneider (2009);
Wheaton (1990)). To our knowledge, we are the rst to look at both renting and owning in
such a framework and the rst to look jointly at renting and owning with adverse selection3.
Our work looks at contracts to supply housing services4 when there are search frictions and
asymmetric information and thus extends the work of Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010)
to include dynamic contracts in a competitive search equilibrium with adverse selection5. In
our equilibrium, contracts can be dynamic while the markets themselves are in steady-state.
Concurrently and complementarily, Chang (2011) and Guerrieri and Shimer (2012) examine
environments where the markets can change dynamically, however all contracts are one-time
exchanges (purchases and sales of assets).
Our main results are twofold. First, an incentive problem in rental markets distorts market
tightnesses6 compared to the public information benchmark. In the economy where households'
expected durations are public information, households with low vacancy hazard rates (long-
duration households) pay lower rental rates and search in less tight markets than households
3Hubert (1995); Miceli and Sirmans (1999) have models with renters and adverse selection in which long-term
tenants have declining rent schedules while Barker (2003) shows that if households have inelastic demand for
housing, those that expect to stay longer do not usually get discounts on their rent. Brueckner (1994) presents a
model with adverse selection and evidence that banks use menus of mortgage points and interest rates to obtain
information on a household's expected mobility.
4and in this sense compliments the work on optimal mortgage design in owner-occupied markets (contracts for
loans backed by housing services) by Piskorski and Tchistyi (2011, 2010)
5Delacroix and Shi (2007) and Albrecht et al. (2010) have adverse selection problems where the side posting
the price has full information. Here, as in Guerrieri et al. (2010), the side directing its search has the superior
information.
6Markets are less tight if households on average take less time to nd a house, or equivalently if landlords take
longer on average to ll a vacancy.
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with high hazard rates.
When expected durations are private information, on the contrary, long-duration households
search in tighter markets than short-duration households, thus they spend more time on average
searching for a house (per separation spell), but pay even lower rental rates once matched. (The
unique equilibrium is separating.) The intuition behind the result is that in equilibrium housing
is under-provided to long-duration households so as to discourage short-duration households
from searching there. In this sense, private information causes housing scarcity in some rental
markets.
In our economy, owning a house solves the private information problem by internalizing the
separation hazard in the optimal search problem of the household, but requires double search
- an owner that wants to move must rst search for a buyer for her house before searching for
her own new home. Our second result is that households that expect to stay in their house long
enough choose to own rather than rent. The distortions implied by the incentive problem in
the rental market pile-up: the deviations from rst-best due to private information (compared
to the public information benchmark) are larger in markets where the long-duration households
search. Meanwhile the owning contract is always incentive compatible while the extra cost
of double search tends to diminish with expected duration. If a household has a high enough
expected duration, the distortions in the rental market due to the information problem dominate
the double search cost in the owning market so that it prefers to own the house even though
owning is assumed to use a less ecient (in a rst-best sense) search technology. In equilibrium,
households with dierent expected durations in their houses search in dierent submarkets:
there are a variety of owning and renting submarkets which dier according to price and market
tightness.
A policy of rent control predictably leads to a lower supply of rental housing and tighter
markets in the regulated market in both public and private information cases. With private
information however, the eects on the regulated market spill into the unregulated market,
leading to lower supply and tighter markets there as well. This happens even though there is no
excess demand in any market (as in e.g. Fallis and Smith (1984)); all markets are in equilibrium.
Instead, by worsening the allocation for low-duration households, rent control exacerbates the
information problem, making it more costly for higher-duration households to screen the low-
duration households.
In the nal part of our paper, we give the economy access to a technology which permits the
building of non-conforming, i.e. customized, houses; which we model as giving a higher utility
ow at some cost to the matching probability. We show that customization appeals most to long-
duration households. So, unlike rent control, the customization technology oers an additional
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way to relax the incentive compatibility constraints in the rental market; thus there may be
\over-customization" in the rental market relative to the public information benchmark. Also,
since the appeals of owning and customization are each increasing in expected duration, more
owners than renters tend to customize. If customization is observable to an econometrician using
hedonics, than the owner-occupiers will appear to live in houses with more amenities, otherwise
they will appear to get a warm glow from owning (that is, they would appear to get a higher
utility ow from the same observable set of house attributes).
Our work on customization is a sort of companion to House and Ozdenoren (2008). In
their model of durable goods, goods that are more durable conform more to average tastes
due to resale concerns. They cite "McMansions" (which are owner-occupied) as an example
of a generic durable good. In our model, durable goods more or less conform based on the
expected duration of the match (rather than the duration of the good). The typical owner-
occupied house is actually relatively varied compared to rental housing in our economy since,
endogenously, owner-occupiers expect to be matched longer with their house.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents economies of renting with public
and then private information; Section 3 presents the owning technology and the equilibrium with
owning and renting; Section 4 presents a numerical example and the eects of rent control while
section 5 presents the customization technology. Section 6 concludes by commenting briey on
three points: how our economy here could be extended to include optimal rental contracts; how
other wedges in the owning market could play a similar role to the one played by double search
here; and the challenges of testing housing ladder theories due to the poor quality of data on
rental vacancies. Most proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Rental market
2.1 Preferences and technology
Time is continuous and the horizon is innite. There is a measure one of households indexed
by their type i 2 I = f1; 2; ::; Ig and a large set of landlords or builders. Let i be the fraction
of households of type i in the population, for all i. If a landlord decides to participate in the
market, she pays a cost H in units of utility to build a house but then houses are costless to
maintain; if she doesn't participate, she gets a payo equal to 0. Households receive a ow
utility of h when they occupy a house and 0 when they do not. Households and landlords each
discount at the same rate  < 1. We assume h > H.
Households that are currently occupying a house separate with it at a hazard rate  : I !
   <+, at which point a separated household no longer receives any utility from living in
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that particular house. Without loss of generality, we assume that  is strictly decreasing. We
will often refer to a household of type i as having a hazard i = (i). We denote   1 and
  lim
i!I
i so that   = [; ]. We will also derive some analytical and computational results for
the special case where fig1i=1 is dense in  . For lack of a better term, we refer to this special
case as the dierential- case.
A rental contract w 2 W species a ow rent, possibly contingent on type, paid by the
household to the landlord if matched. The contract ends in the case of separation.7 We consider
two cases. In the rst, a household's type is publicly observable and so contracts are also free
to have type-specic rents. However, we will show that in equilibrium, only one type is lured by
each contract. In the second case, a household's type is private information. In this case, by the
revelation principle, we assume that landlords post a contract which contains direct revelation
mechanisms for each type, without loss of generality. Following Guerrieri et al. (2010), we will
show that we can assume without loss of generality that landlords post contracts with type-
independent mechanisms. More precisely, in the private information case the equilibrium with
contracts is payo equivalent to the equilibrium with degenerate mechanisms, oering the same
rent to each household. This will eventually simplify the notation greatly.
The matching process between households and landlords is frictional. At any given time
landlords post a single contract at zero cost and households direct their search to the most
attractive contracts.8
Associated with any contract w, let u be the measure of households directing their search to w
and v be the measure of landlords posting w. Dene  = u=v as the market tightness associated
with contract w,  : W! <+. Households nd a house at rate h() where h : <+ ! <+ and
h is decreasing in . Landlords ll a vacancy at rate l(), where l : <+ ! <+ is increasing in
. We assume that l() = h(), that is equivalent to constant returns to scale in matching,
and h(0) = l(1) = 1 and h(1) = l(0) = 0. We assume that the elasticity of l(),
"()  l()
dl()
d is constant: "() = ".
Let  i be the share of households of type i applying to any given contract w. That is  (w) =
f 1(w);  2(w); :::;  I(w)g 2 I , where I is the I-dimensional unit simplex,  : W ! I . The
market tightness (w) and the share of households applying to w,  (w), associated with every
contract w are determined in equilibrium.
Let Vr(i; r; ) and Zr(i; r; ) be the expected values of living in a house and searching for
7We will restrict our attention to rental contracts with a xed ow rent. With some loss of simplicity but with
no change in our qualitative results, we could endogenously rule out payments contingent on separation if we also
imposed limited commitment constraints on both the household and landlord. See section 6 for some discussion
of fully dynamic contracts.
8Matching is bilateral, thus every household can only apply to one contract, but he can use mixed strategies.
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a house9, respectively, to the households of type i applying to any given contract, w with rental
payment for that type of r.  = (w) is the market tightness associated with the contract w.
Then:
Vr(i; r; ) = h  r + i(Zr(i; r; )  Vr(i; r; ))
Zr(i; r; ) =
l()

(Vr(i; r; )  Zr(i; r; ))
Let Yr(i; r; ) and Xr(w; ) be the expected values of an occupied house when matched with
a type i and a vacant house, respectively, to the landlord:
Yr(i; r; ) = r + i(Xr(w; )  Yr(i; r; ))
Xr(w; ) = l()
X
i2I
 i(w)(Yr(i; ri; ) Xr(w; ))
where  i(w) is the share of households of type i applying to the contract w, specifying rent ri
for that type, and  is the market tightness associated with that contract.
Solving for the ow value of searching Zr(i; r; ) and posting Xr(w) gives:
Zr(i; r; ) =
l()
(+ i) + l()
(h  r) (1)
Xr(w; ) =

1 + l()
X
i2I
 i(w)
+ i
 1
l()
X
i2I
 i(w)ri
+ i
(2)
Notice that Zr(i; r; ) < 0 if r > h, 8i and 8 > 0, thus no household would apply to
a contract that imposes a ow rent r higher than the ow utility from housing h. Similarly,
Xr(w; ) < H if ri < H for all i for which  i(w) > 0.
2.2 Equilibrium with public information
A competitive search equilibrium satises the following conditions in every submarket: (i) land-
lords maximize expected prots; (ii) free entry (new entrants earn zero prots in expectation);
(iii) households direct their search to the most convenient posted vacancy; (iv)  = (w) is
consistent with rational expectations in equilibrium but also for any possible deviation w0.
More precisely, a landlord oering w0 6= w expects that households apply until the market
tightness 0 implies an expected value for the household equal to the outside option Zr, that is
taken as given by the (atomistic) rm. Formally:
9These are the values of searching and living in the same market, repeatedly ad innitum
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Denition 1. A competitive search equilibrium with renting and public information is a vector
fZir gi2I, a set of contracts Wr WI each of which species a rent ri for each i 2 I, a function
r : WI ! <+, a measure  on WI with support Wr , and a function  : WI ! I satisfying,
for each i 2 I:
(i) Landlords' prot maximization and free entry:
1 + l(

r(w))
X
i2I
 i(w)
+ i
 1
l(

r(w))
X
i2I
 i(w)ri
+ i
 H
with equality if w 2Wr .
(ii) Households' optimal search:
Let Zir  max
w02Wr
1

e(

r(w
0))
r(w0)(+ i) + e(r(w0))
(h  r0i)
Then 8 w 2WI
Zir 
1

e(

r(w))
r(w)(+ i) + e(r(w))
(h  ri)
with equality if r(w) > 0 and  i(w) > 0.
(iii) market clearing: Z
Wr
 i(w)

r(w)d(w) = i 8i 2 I
The equilibrium denition imposes restrictions on the o-equilibrium beliefs of the landlords.
The optimal search value of any type-i household is dened over the set of contracts posted in
equilibrium Wr only, but under any deviating contract w0 =2 Wr , landlords expect market
tightness r(w0) to adjust to make all types of households weakly worse o.
We can distinguish competitive equilibria according to whether there are contracts which
attract more than one type in equilibrium.
Denition 2. A separating competitive equilibrium is any competitive equilibrium where for
all w 2Wr and for all i,  i(w) > 0 implies  i(w) = 1. A pooling equilibrium is any competitive
equilibrium that is not separating. Two competitive equilibria (indexed by A and B) are alloca-
tively equivalent if for all i 2 I and wA 2 WAr ,  i(wA) > 0 implies there exists a wB 2 WBr
with  i(w
B) > 0 such that rAi = r
B
i and 
A
r (w
A) = Br (wB) and vice versa.
Lemma 1. If there exists a pooling competitive equilibrium with public information, then there
exists an allocatively equivalent separating competitive equilibrium.
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Proof. See Appendix.
In separating competitive equilibria, the market endogenously segments into submarkets,
one for any dierent type i of households. Thus without loss of generality we can assume that
a contract w in a separating competitive equilibrium contains a menu of rents where only one
rent ri < h and thereafter label w = ri. This also pins down the measure of landlords posting
the contract w to households of type i, given by v(w) = iil(r (w))+ir (w)
.
2.2.1 Characterization
A necessary and sucient condition for a separating competitive search equilibrium is the fol-
lowing:10
Proposition 1. For any type i of households, a posted contract wir and the associated market
tightness ir  r(wir ) are part of an equilibrium allocation if and only if they solve the following
constrained maximization problem, Ri:
max
wi;i
l(i)
i(+ i) + l(i)
(h  wi)
s.t.
l(i)
+ i + l(i)
wi  H
The equilibrium allocation maximizes the expected value of search of any type-i household
conditional on the rms making non-negative prots.
Proposition 2. A solution to Ri exists for each i. The solution is unique.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2. In the solution to R, for all i; j 2 I with i 6= j, ir 6= jr
Proof. Using the constraint with equality to substitute for wir , the rst order condition implies
the following equilibrium condition for the market tightness:
h
H
= 1 +
1
ir
"
1  " +
+ i
l(ir )(1  ")
(3)
The implicit solution for ir is strictly increasing in i.
10See e.g. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) for a proof, with one caveat to the proof of suciency: in our setting,
even if mechanisms in Wr are separating, other mechanisms in W
I can be pooling. It is straightforward to use the
argument in the proof of Lemma 1 to show that if the suciency conditions are met for a separating competitive
search with separating-only mechanisms then they will be met here too.
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Lemma 3. Any competitive equilibrium with public information is a separating competitive
equilibrium.
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2 and Proposition 1.
The equilibrium values of the ow rent wir and the household's expected value Zir are
given by:
wir =
+ i + l(
i
r )
l(ir )
H
Zir =
1
ir
"
1  "H
We have the following comparative static results as i varies:
Result 1. In equilibrium, as the separation hazard i increases:
(i) the market tightness ir increases;
(ii) the ow rent wir increases;
(iii) the expected value to households Zir decreases.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, households with lower expected durations face tighter markets and higher rents once
matched and as a consequence have lower search values.
Analytically, for the dierential- case, by dierentiating11 the equilibrium condition (3) we
obtain:
dr
d
=
1
"
r
2
r(+ ) + l(r)
> 0
dwr
d
=
H
r(+ ) + l(r)
> 0
dZr
d
=  Zr
r
"(r(+ ) + l(r))
< 0
11We need to explicitly dene our notion of dierentiation. Let f : N! < and g : range(f)! G  <. Dene
@g
@f
jq = lim
q0!q
g(q0)  g(q)
q0   q
where q; q0 2 range(f). The total derivative is dened analogously.
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2.3 Renting with private information
The equilibrium allocation in the public information case implies that every type j < I strictly
prefers to search in a higher (i > j) type's market if she was oered the higher type's contracted
rent. In this section, we assume that the type of the household, i, is known only by the household.
So, the public information allocation will not be incentive compatible under private information.
A mechanism in this setting would be a set of rents frgi2I. However, from the households
value of being matched, it is clear that the only mechanism compatible with truth telling oers
the same rent to any reported type.
Lemma 4. A contract is incentive compatible if and only if it oers the same rent to any
reported type.
Proof. Follows from the household's value of being matched to a contract.
So we can safely associate any incentive compatible contract w with its associated rent (and
thus can assume w 2 [H; h]). We dene the equilibrium following and extending the denition
in Guerrieri et al. (2010) to a dynamic setting.
Lemma 5. Sorting: 8i, w 2 [H; h],   0, and  > 0, there exists a couple (w0; 0) 2
B(w; (w)), with w
0 < w and 0 > , such that
Zr(j ; w
0; 0) > Zr(j ; w; ) ; 8 j  i and Zr(j ; w0; 0) < Zr(j ; w; ) ; 8 j > i
Proof. Follows from equation 1.
The sorting condition is sucient to have a separating equilibrium and diers from the
condition in Guerrieri et al. (2010) in that it involves local perturbations in both the contract
w and the market tightness .
Denition 3. A competitive search equilibrium with renting and private information is a vector
fZip gi2I, a set of rents (i.e. incentive compatible contracts) Wp  [H; h]I, a measure  on
[H; h] with support Wp, a function p : [H; h] ! <+ and a function  : [H; h] ! I
satisfying:
(i) landlords' prot maximization and free entry: for any w 2 [H; h]
1 +

l(

p(w))
X
i2I
 i(w)
+ i
 1 1
w  H
with equality if w 2Wp.
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(ii) households' optimal search: Let
Zip  max
w02Wp
1

l(

p(w
0))
p(w0)(+ i) + l(p(w0))
(h  w0)
Then 8w 2 [H; h] and 8i
Zip 
1

l(

p(w))
p(w)(+ i) + l(p(w))
(h  w)
with equality if p(w) > 0 and  i(w) > 0.
(iii) market clearing: Z
Wp
 i(w)

p(w)d(w) = i 8i
As in the public information case, the equilibrium denition imposes conditions on the o-
equilibrium beliefs of the landlords. Heuristically, a landlord considering whether to post a
deviating contract w0 imagines an initial market tightness  = 0. If no households is willing
to apply, then  = 0 and the deviation is not protable. Otherwise, some households apply,
increasing market tightness , until only one type of household i is indierent about the deviating
w0 and all others j (weakly) prefer their equilibrium contracts. This in turn pins down the share
 i of households applying to that contract.
2.3.1 Equilibrium and Characterization
The characterization of the equilibrium with private information is equivalent to the public
information equilibrium with an extra incentive compatibility constraint that imposes that no
other types of households j are attracted to the contract wi. In the next proposition, we
show that at the optimum, for all i > 1, only the marginal incentive compatibility constraints
IC(i   1; i) bind: every type (i   1) is indierent between his own contract and the contract
oered to the type i with marginally higher expected duration.
Proposition 3. Let the problem (PR) be dened by the following constrained maximization
problem (PRi), for any i 2 I:
max
2<+;w2<+
Zr(i; w; )
s.t.
l()
+ i + l()
w  rH
and Zr(j ; w; )  Zr(j ; wjp ; jp ) for all j 6= i [IC(j; i)]
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where wip ; ip is an optimal solution for i.
The solution of (PR) exists and is unique. Moreover, only the marginal incentive compatibility
constraints IC(i  1; i) bind, for all i > 1:
Zr(i 1; wip ; 
i
p ) = Zr(i 1; w
;i 1
p ; 
;i 1
p ) and
Zr(j ; w
i
p ; 
i
p ) < Zr(j ; w
j
p ; 
j
p ) 8 j 6= i; i  1
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, for the type with the highest separation hazard, 1 = , the equilibrium allocation
is the same as the one with public information. Then, the problem is solved iteratively for all
other types:
(i) For i = 1, w1p and 1p solve R1
(ii) For each i > 1, wip and ip are the solutions to
max
2<+;w2<+
Zr(i; w; )
s.t.
l()
+ i + l()
w  H
and Zr(i 1; wip ; 
i
p )  Zr(i 1; w;i 1p ; ;i 1p )
We are now ready to prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and characterize
the equilibrium allocation:
Proposition 4. There exists a unique separating equilibrium. A set of contracts fwip gI; wip 2
[H; h] and market tightnesses fip gI; ip  p(wip )  i associated with their respective types
i are part of the equilibrium allocation if and only if they solve the problem PR.
Proof. See Appendix.
We have the following comparative static results as i varies.
Result 2. In equilibrium, as the separation hazard i increases:
(i) the market tightness ip decreases;
(ii) the ow rent wip increases;
(iii) the expected value to households Zip decreases;
Proof. See Appendix.
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Analytically, for the dierential- case, then:
dp
d
=   1
+ 

(1  ")Z

p
H
  "
p
 1
< 0
dwp
d
=
(1  ")Zp
l(p)

(1  ")Z

p
H
  "
p
 1
> 0
dZp
d
=  Zp
p
p(+ ) + l(p)
< 0
Contrary to the public information case, low- types search in tighter markets in equilibrium,
and pay lower rents if matched. In this way landlords are able to optimally (with the least cost)
separate types of households by posting contracts wip lower than the rst-best optimum wir to
those that expect to stay longer, at the cost of higher market tightness ip .
Households that expect to stay longer are less aected by a higher market tightness (and
thus longer expected search times), because they expect to separate from the house and pay
the search cost less frequently. On the other hand, those that expect to stay longer are more
aected by a lower rent w because they expect to be matched a higher fraction of time for any
given market tightness . The combination of these two factors implies that the second best
allocation dictates tighter markets for those that expect to stay longer, contrary to the rst best
allocation.
3 Owning market
An owning contract simply species an up-front payment P paid by the household to the land-
lord, which may vary across markets. Preferences and technology (except the search technology)
are the same as in the rental market. In particular, households derive the same ow utility h if
they own or rent the house, and landlords (i.e. builders) pay the same building cost H to enter
the market.
As will become clear below, absent some further friction, owning would eciently solve the
private information problem and all markets would be owner-occupied markets12. To provide
heterogeneity, we assume that if a homeowner needs to move, she rst must sell the house before
she can search for a new one to buy. Thus, there is an extra friction in the owning market that
takes the form of double search.13 Moreover, we assume that housing cannot be resold in a
dierent market.14 This implies that an owner leaving her house posts a contract in the same
12The i = 1 type would be indierent between owning and renting.
13There are plenty of other potential candidate frictions. For instance, a (possibly heterogeneous) "nancing
cost" which provides some disutility at the time of purchase or throughout occupancy.
14Geographical separation in markets would be one way to prevent homeowners from selling in a dierent
market from which they bought.
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owning market and thus (in equilibrium) at the same price paid to buy it.15
Builders only have to sell a new house. It is important to notice that the owning market
is not aected by the private information friction, because a household that buys the house,
an owner, fully internalizes the expected search cost eventually paid in the case of separation,
contrary to a renter. In other terms, the builder's expected value of posting in an owning market
with tightness  a contract for sale at price P is simply given by:
Xo(P; ) =
l()
+ l()
P (4)
Notice that 4 is independent of i.
The values of searching as a buyer, living and searching as a seller in a market with market
tightness  and price P for a household of type i, respectively, are given by:
Zo(i; P; ) = h()(Vo(i; P; )  Zo(i; P; )  P )
Vo(i; P; ) = h+ i(So(i; P; )  Vo(i; P; ))
So(i; P; ) = l()(P + Zo(i; P; )  So(i; P; ))
When a separation shock hits the owner (with hazard rate i), the household incurs two search
costs, one on each side of the market. Solving for the ow value of searching as a buyer gives:
Zo(i; P; ) =

1 +
+ i
l()=
+
i
+ l()| {z }
wedge from double search
 1
h 

1 +
i
+ l()

P

The wedge will imply that, in the case of public information, renting is always preferred to
owning. Moreover, the eect of the wedge is larger the higher is the separation hazard i (for a
given ): households that move more often pay the double search costs more often.
3.1 Equilibrium with only owning
Neither builders nor owners when selling care about the types of the buyers in the market in
which they have posted. So owning markets do not depend on whether households' types are
public or private information. The equilibrium denition of the owning market is similar to
the equilibrium in the rental market with private information in that contracts (prices) are not
type-specic: each market oers just one contract price. The market endogenously segments into
submarkets and we can characterize the equilibrium allocation using an equivalent constrained
maximization problem.
15This assumption greatly simplies the analysis.
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Denition 4. A competitive search equilibrium with owning is a vector fZio gi2I, a set of
prices P  = fP igi2I 2 [H;h=]I, a measure  on [H;h=] with support P , and functions
o : [H;h=]! <+ and  : [H;h=]! I satisfying:
(i) Builders' prot maximization and free entry:
l(

o(P ))
+ l(o(P ))
P  H
with equality if P 2 P.
(ii) Households' optimal search:
Let Zio  max
P 02P 
1


1 +
+ i
l(o(P 0))=o(P 0)
+
i
+ l(o(P 0))
 1
h 

1 +
i
+ l(o(P 0))

P 0

Then 8P 2 [H;h=] and i 2 I
Zio 
1


1 +
+ i
l(o(P ))=o(P )
+
i
+ l(o(P ))
 1
h 

1 +
i
+ l(o(P ))

P

with equality if o(P ) > 0 and  i(P ) > 0.
(iii) market clearing: Z
P 
 i(P )

o(P )d(P ) = i 8i
As in the economies with renting, the equilibrium in the owning economy can be found by
solving a constrained optimization problem iteratively by type.16 The optimal market tightness
conditional on owning for each type, io , is the solution to the following equation17:
(+ i + l)

+ l
l
  "
io
+ i + l
(+ i)(+ l)

+ " =
h
H

"lli
(+ l)io (+ i)
+ (+ l + ")

3.2 Equilibrium with both renting and owning
We are now ready to study the equilibrium problem in the housing market with private infor-
mation.
Landlords/builders are free to enter in both the rental and the owning market. If they
enter, they pay a building cost H and post a contract in one market. Households have private
16That is, a similar version of either Proposition 1 or 3 holds. Furthermore, it is also easy to show that a similar
type of incentive compatibility constraint as the one in Proposition 3 never binds.
17where l implies l(
i
o )
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information over their expected duration of stay, or mobility hazard rate , and direct their
search to their preferred postings.
In the appendix, we formally dene a competitive equilibrium with private information and
both renting and owning. The equilibrium with both renting and owning can be characterized
by the iterative solutions to a problem analogous to those with only owning or renting18:
Zipo  maxfrent;owng

~Zip  max
~ip2<+;wi2[H;h]
Zr(i; wi; ~
i
p); max
io2<+;Pi2[H;h=]
Zo(i; Pi; 
i
o)

s.t.
l(~
i
p)
+ i + l(~ip)
wi  H
Pi =
+ l(
i
o)
l(io)
H
Zi 1po  Zr(i 1; wi; ~ip) for all i > 1
Result 3. (i) The equilibrium expected value of search in the owning market Zio is lower than
the equilibrium expected value of search in the rental market with public information Zir ,
and the equilibrium market tightness is lower:
Zio < Z
i
r and 
i
o < 
i
r 8i
(ii) If  = 0, then there exists a threshold ~i  I such that 8i > ~i Zio > ~Zip .
Proof. See Appendix.
The equilibrium in the private information rental market for the highest- type is the same as
in the public information case, thus Result 3 implies that households with the lowest expected
durations always prefer to search in the rental market, even if information is private. The
maximands to the owning part of characterization are identical to the solutions for the owning-
only economy above.
For households with lower 's, the equilibrium in the (private information) rental market is
increasingly distorted with respect to the rst best (public information) equilibrium. Moreover,
the extra search friction in the owning market is less severe as  decreases, because long duration
households move less frequently. At the limit,  ! 0, the household stays in the same location
forever and is not aected by the double search friction: the expected values of search in the
owning market and in the public information rental market are the same. Moreover, for low
enough , owning-occupied markets dominate rental markets (with private information).
18We omit the proof, however it is similar to the case with only renting
16
4 Example and application to rent control
As a parametrization, we set  = :05, h = :1, H = 1, l = 
" with " = :5, and we allow for
 2 [:2; :7], that is expected durations between 1:4 and 5 years, approximately. Figure 1 plots
the market tightness, or queue length, and the ow rent (or housing price) as a function of 
in the three economies: renting with public information, renting with private information and
owning.
The queue length increases as  increases in the case of renting with public information and
in the owning economy (and it is shorter in the latter case), while it decreases as  increases in
the renting economy with private information, because low -types signal themselves by waiting
longer. In both renting economies, the ow rent increases with , as shown in gure 2: it
increases faster in the private information case to oset the positive eect of the longer queue
length faced by low -types on landlords' prots. The housing price in the owning economy
markets, expressed in ow terms, decreases slightly as  increases.
Finally, gure 3 shows the expected value of searching for a house as a function of  in the
three markets: renting with public information, renting with private information and owning.
The value of renting with public information is always higher than the other cases (and it
coincides with the private information renting for the highest value of ). The expected value
increases as  decreases in all markets, but it increases less in the private information renting
market.
4.1 Rent control
We continue the example by analyzing the same economy but with the addition of a very stylized
rent control policy. Here rent control is just a simple rent ceiling (which we set to 90 percent of
the highest rent in the uncontrolled economy). Figures 4, 5 and 6 show, respectively, the queue
length, rents and expected value of searching in the controlled economy.
In the case of public information, the rent control policy distorts the markets for the shortest-
duration households the most; their queues lengthen considerably and the supply of regulated
housing falls. In fact, if the rent ceiling were lower, it is possible that the distortions to these
households' markets are high enough to push them into ownership. All rental markets that had
rents above the ceiling in the uncontrolled economy now have rents at the ceiling rate. However,
because markets segment perfectly with public information, rent control does not aect the
uncontrolled rental markets that already had low rents.
With private information, all rental markets are aected by the ceiling even though only
the low-duration households have rents at the ceiling rate. That the controlled market aects
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the uncontrolled markets is not due to some households leaving the controlled market for an
uncontrolled one, as in e.g. Fallis and Smith (1984) (where there is excess demand in the
controlled market) and Weibull (1983) (where there is no excess demand) nor to misallocation
of high-quality housing (as hinted at in Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) and examined more broadly
for the case of China by Wang (2011)). Here, there is no excess demand; the controlled market
is in "equilibrium", albeit an inecient one19. Instead, rent control exacerbates the private
information problem by making the low-duration households worse-o in their own market,
tightening the incentive compatibility constraint. Queues in all rental markets are higher and
the supply of rental housing is everywhere lower. The lower expected value of searching in the
rental market also leads to more ownership, which, unlike in the case of public information,
occurs with any binding rent ceiling.
Obviously rent control is not a welfare-improving policy in our economy. In fact, the Pareto
optimal policy would be a system of market dependent lump-sum taxes and transfers to house-
holds that eectively shares the surplus that the longer-duration households have over the
shorter-duration ones in the public information economy20. Rather than focusing on these
policies though, we instead next endow the economy with a customization technology which in
equilibrium helps screen low-duration types.
5 Customization
As we have seen, the private information problem can be decentralized in a rather easy way:
some houses are for sale while other houses are for rent. It is "easy" for a household to direct
its search in this case. In this section, we relax the assumption that all houses oer the same
utility ow to all households and that this utility ow is observable prior to a match. There
are generally many attributes, like specic location, the quality of the light in the house and so
forth, that are often only observable in person. Tastes for these particular attributes can vary -
some households value a quiet residential street more than others. To capture some of this, we
add a customization technology similar to ones used in random-search models of housing (e.g.
Arnott (1989); Igarashi (1991)). We assume that customization raises the ow utility that a
household gets from the house at a cost of reduced matching.
19There is no excess demand or supply at the controlled rent, and in that sense the controlled market is in
equilibrium (as in Weibull (1983)). However landlords would enter into the market oering a higher rent and
lower implied market tightness, if they could. Therefore neither the public nor private information controlled
market allocations are competitive equilibriums as dened above. Rather they are competitive equilibriums to
economies with the added restriction that w 2 [H; w]I, where w is the rent ceiling.
20This optimum can potentially replicate the rst best queues and rents if the masses of long-duration households
are large enough.
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Formally, a house can be customized or not. An uncustomized house gives a utility ow of
h. A customized house has a variety  located on a circle of circumference 1. Households have
idiosyncratic tastes over varieties, denoted by  and known only by the household. A household
of taste  living in a customized house of variety  receives a utility ow of h+ c (with c > 0) if
d(; ) < 12 , where  > 1, and receives a ow of 0 otherwise.
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Tastes are distributed uniformly over the population and independently of type i. We assume
that a contract can specify whether or not a house has been customized but not the variety of
customization. The variety of a particular house is not known to a prospective renter or owner
until after the household is matched with the house. At this point the household observes the
variety of the house and can then reject the match (and thus the contract) and continue to
search.
Lastly, we assume that when houses are built, the builders know the measure of customized
houses in the economy but do not observe the distribution of existing varieties. Thus builders
pursue symmetric mixed strategies with regards to variety choice and the resulting distribution
of varieties is uniform.
Our assumptions mean that: i) if a household chooses to search in a customized market, it
will optimally choose to search there until it is matched with a house for which it is well-matched
(i.e. gets h+ c utility ow from); ii) acceptable matches in a customized market with a mass of
u searchers and a mass v postings will occur at a rate mc(u; v) = m(u; v)=.
5.1 Customization in rental markets
The ow value of searching in a customized rental market for a given i, w and market tightness
 is given by Zc(i; w; ) (and likewise the ow value of vacancy is Xc(i; w; )).
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Vc(i; w; ) = h+ c  w + (Zc(i; w; )  Vc(i; w; ))
Zc(i; w; ) =
l()

(Vc(i; w; )  Zc(i; w; ))
Yc(i; w; ) = w + (Xc(i; w; )  Yc(i; w; ))
Xc(i; w; ) =
l()

(Yc(i; w; ) Xc(i; w; ))
With public information, for any market that customizes, the equilibrium conditions for
21d : [0; 1) [0; 1)! <+ with d(; ) = minfj   j; 1 + minf   ;   gg
22To keep notation as light as possible, we note that only separating equilibria are possible here and drop Xc's
dependency on 	
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market tightness, rents and search value for each type (icr; wicr; Zicr; respectively) are
h+ c
H
= 1 +
1
icr
"
1  " +
(+ i)
l(icr)(1  ")
wicr =
(+ i) + l(
i
cr)
l(icr)
H
Zicr =
1
icr
"
1  "H
Note that  inuences the ow value only through the equilibrium queue length.
The overall equilibrium value of search for a household with public information renting
only but with the choice of customization is then the upper envelope of Zicr and Zir . Finally,
customization with public information is a normal good in the sense that if any type prefers
their customized market to their (shadow) uncustomized one, then all types with longer expected
durations will also prefer their respective customized markets:
Result 4. If there exists an ~i such that Z~icr  Z~ir , then Zicr > Zir for all i > ~i.
Proof. See Appendix.
5.2 Customization in the owning market
The analysis of the owning market with customization is similar to the case without customiza-
tion. For any type i, price P and market tightness :
Zco(i; P; ) =
h()

(Vco(i; P; )  Zco(i; P; )  P )
Vco(i; P; ) = h+ c+ i(Sco(i; P; )  Vco(i; P; ))
Sco(i; P; ) =
l()

(P + Zco(i; P; )  Sco(i; P; ))
The market tightness in a given market is determined from the builders' zero prot condition:
P =
 + l()
l()
H
5.2.1 Customization with private information
The problem of customization when information is private follows similarly. We skip the deni-
tion of a competitive equilibrium and turn immediately to how to solve for its unique allocation.
Solving iteratively, for any type i, with icp and wicp the argmaxs for customized renting, iup
and wiup the argmaxs for uncustomized renting, ico and P ico the argmaxs for customized owning,
iuo and P iuo the argmaxs for uncustomized owning, and Zicu the maximum over all options:
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Zicu max

max
cp2<+;wcp2<+
Zc(i; wcp; cp); max
up2<+;wup2<+
Zr(i; wup; up);
max
co2<+;Pco2<+
Zco(i; Pco; co); max
uo2<+;Puo2<+
Zo(i; Puo; uo)

s.t.
l(up)
+ i + l(up)
wup  H
l(cp)
(+ i) + l(cp)
wcp  H
Pco
l(co)
 + l(co)
= H
Puo
l(uo)
+ l(uo)
= H
Zc(j ; wc; c)  Zjcu for all j < i
Zr(j ; wu; u)  Zjcu for all j < i
We analyze numerically some properties of the equilibrium in the following example.
5.3 Example continued
We continue the above example (without rent control) by adding  = 1:35 and c = :01. Figure
7 shows the value of searching in each rental market with private info, Zcp, Zup. There is
a kink in Zcp and the customized queue length path; the incentive compatibility constraint
does not bind in customized market for the lowest types and thus queue lengths can fall as 
decreases for as long as the constraint doesn't bind (as in gure 8). However, these markets are
non-existent in equilibrium as the values of searching in the customized markets are dominated
by the uncustomized markets' values for these types.
For higher types the values of search in the uncustomized and customized markets are nearly
the same (although the customized market is slightly better): for any type, slightly worse types
are searching in their own customized markets where their search value is higher than it otherwise
would be if there were only uncustomized markets. This relaxes the incentive compatibility
constraint in the uncustomized market (relative to the case with only that market) nearly to
the value of the customized market's one. However, the value of search in the uncustomized
market is still slightly below because it is still harder to properly incentivize lower types in an
uncustomized market and so distortions using the queue length are larger.
Figures 9, 10, 11 plot the upper envelopes over the values of customized versus uncustomized,
and the queues and rents in all markets. There are several points worth noting.
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First, private information leads to "over-customization" in the rental market: some markets
are customized with private information where the types' corresponding market with public
information would not customize. As in the simpler economy without customization but with
private information, the market uses longer search times to screen away shorter duration house-
holds from the long duration households' markets. In the economy with the customization
technology, there are two ways to lengthen search times: lengthen queues and customizing. So
customization has two benets with private information (higher ow utility and better screening)
which leads it to be adopted for types that would not have adopted it under public information.
Second, in general there may be four regions (from low types to high types in -space)
where rst the private information equilibrium is uncustomized renting, then customized renting,
then uncustomized owning, then nally customized owning for the highest types. However, the
example shows that one or more of the regions may not exist for particular parameterizations.
In our example (which turns out to be qualitatively typical), there are no uncustomized owner-
occupied houses in equilibrium and relatively fewer customized houses "available" for renters.
The average homeowner is this example gets a higher ow utility from living in his house (h+ c)
than does the average renter. An econometrician who did observe this customization would
think that homeowners get a warm glow from owning.
6 Conclusion
We build a competitive search equilibrium model of housing tenure choices where households
have private information over their expected duration, and we study the properties of rental
and owning markets in a search equilibrium. Owning a house solves the private information
problem but at the cost of double search: owners that move to another location must sell their
house before searching for another one. We show that both markets endogenously segment into
submarkets, one for every type of households.
In the rental markets, households that expect to stay longer search in thinner markets in
order to discourage more footloose households from searching in the same market. Relative
to the rst-best, the distortions in the rental market with private information increase with
expected duration. On the other hand, the wedge due to double search in the owning market
decreases with expected duration. As a result, households that expect to stay longest in their
houses will be the ones that choose to own (if any choose to own).
Rent control leads to distortions in both controlled and uncontrolled markets by exacerbating
incentive compatibility constraints when information is private. A customization technology
that raises the utility from housing at the cost of a lower probability of a match can help screen
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low-duration types. The extra screening leads to over-customization in the private information
rental markets relative to the public information benchmark. However, since the appeal of
customization is higher for households that expect to stay in their house longer, owner-occupiers
tend to customize more.
Though the rental contracts considered here are limited to constant, duration-independent
rents, it would be relatively straightforward to consider duration-dependent contracts (and thus
fully optimal) subject to additional limited participation constraints that, absent a separation
shock, neither the landlord nor the household's continuation values in the contract fall below
their outside options of search. Optimal duration-dependent contracts could achieve the rst
best as long as households remain risk-neutral. If households were risk-neutral, the optimal rent
contract with private information would feature an upfront payment to the landlord followed
by a constant rent w = H. However, Barker (2003) nds little evidence for declining rent
schedules. If households are risk-averse, we suggest (without proving) that the equilibrium
contracts oered in such an economy may otherwise have many of the same qualitative features
as those presented above.
Other scopes for extension include considering other wedges in the owning market other than
double search. For instance, one could assume a (potentially heterogenous) ow cost of owning
due to borrowing constraints. As long as any mooted wedge does not increase too quickly with
expected duration, those with the highest expected durations will choose to own.
Theories with housing ladders are essentially theories where an otherwise identical house
is available only in either the rental or owner-occupied market. Sadly, data on rental vacancy
durations across narrowly dened markets are, to our knowledge, poor. So direct measures of
housing ladders remain elusive.
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7 Appendix
Denition of Competitive Equilibrium With Renting and Owning
Denition 5. A competitive search equilibrium with renting, owning and private information
is a set of vectors fZipo; Zio; ~Zipgi2I, a set of incentive compatible rents ~Wp  [H; h]I, a set of
prices P  = fP igi2I 2 [H;h=]I, a measure r on [H; h] with support ~Wp, a measure o on
[H;h=] with support P , functions ~p : [H; h] ! <+ and o : [H;h=] ! <+ and functions
 r : [H; h]! I and  o : [H;h=]! I satisfying:
(i) Landlords' prot maximization and free entry: for any w 2 [H; h]
1 +

l(~

p(w))
X
i2I
 r;i(w)
+ i
 1 1
w  H
with equality if w 2 ~Wp.
(ii) Builders' prot maximization and free entry: for any P 2 [H;h=]
l(

o(P ))
+ l(o(P ))
P  H
with equality if P 2 P .
(iii) Households' optimal search: Let
~Zip  max
w02 ~Wp
1

l(~

p(w
0))
~p(w0)(+ i) + l(~p(w0))
(h  w0)
Zio  max
P 02P 
1


1 +
+ i
l(o(P 0))=o(P 0)
+
i
+ l(o(P 0))
 1
h 

1 +
i
+ l(o(P 0))

P 0

and Zipo = maxfZio; ~Zipg 8 i 2 I
Then 8w 2 [H; h] and 8i
Zipo 
1

l(~

p(w))
~p(w)(+ i) + l(~p(w))
(h  w)
with equality if ~p(w) > 0 and  r;i(w) > 0. And 8P 2 [H;h=] and 8i
Zipo 
1


1 +
+ i
l(o(P ))=o(P )
+
i
+ l(o(P ))
 1
h 

1 +
i
+ l(o(P ))

P

with equality if o(P ) > 0 and  o;i(P ) > 0.
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(iv) market clearing:Z
~Wp
 r;i(w)~

p(w)dr(w) +
Z
P 
 o;i(P )

o(P )do(P ) = i 8i
Proofs not in the main text
Proof of Lemma 1
Let w be any contract in any pooling equilibrium for which there exists i 6= j and  i(w) > 0,
 j(w) > 0. The landlord takes the expected values Zr(i; ri; (w)) and Zr(j ; rj ; (w)) of the
two types as given.
A landlord cannot make strictly lower expected prots from either type. If she could, then
a deviating contract would be the menu that does not oer an attractive rent to that type.
By rational expectations, the expected queue length must be the same and so the landlord will
make strictly higher expected prots, a contradiction. Therefore:
l((w))
+ i + l((w))
ri =
l((w))
+ j + l((w))
rj = H (5)
The lemma follows trivially from there.
Proof of Proposition 2
We want to prove the existence and uniqueness of the solution of the "unconstrained" max-
imization problem. We follow the following steps (and drop dependence on i)
The landlord's zero prot constraint (ZPC) constraint holds with equality for
each type: Suppose not. We can increase Z by decreasing w and/or  in a ball B"(w

r ; 

r) and
still meet the constraint for " small enough. Thus (wr ; r) is not a maximum.
Existence. We can impose the ZPC with equality: zpcr (;w) =  1

(+)H
w H

. The
maximization problem simplies to: maxw2[H;h] Z
zpc
r (;w) = Zr(;w; 
zpc
r (;w)). Note that as
w ! H, zpcr (;w) ! 1 and (
zpc
r )
zpcr
(;w) ! 0, thus Zzpcr (;w = H) = 0. The objective
function is continuous and the constraint set is compact.
The solution is interior. From above, Zzpcr (;w = H) = 0 and it is easy to show that
Zzpcr (;w = h) = 0. Moreover, Z
zpc
r (;w) > 0 for all w 2 (H; h).
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Uniqueness. Analytically, it is easier to solve the equivalent problem max2<+ Zr(;w
zpc
r (; ); ),
where wzpcr satises the ZPC. The objective function is non-negative i   (+)Hh H , or equiv-
alently    1

(+)H
h H

, and lim!1 Zr(;w
zpc
r (; ); ) = 0. Since the objective function is
continuously dierentiable on <+, the rst-order condition is necessary for an optimum:
h
H
= 1 +
1
r
"
1  " +
+ 
l(r)(1  ")
(6)
The right-hand side of (6) is a decreasing, continuous, function in . Thus, there is only one
solution  of the maximization problem.
Proof of Result 1
From (6), r is increasing in , so from the zero-prot condition for landlords, wr is increas-
ing in . So Zr is decreasing in .
Proof of Proposition 3
We go through the following steps:
The IC(j; i) with j > i, never binds; a type with j < i never wants to deviate to
the i-contract. Any contract and associated market-tightness for a type i is also feasible for
any type j > i.
For all fPRig, the ZPC binds and, for i > 1, at least one IC must bind.
By contradiction. Suppose not. If no constraint ever binds, then Zip is maximized by setting
w =  = 0, but that violates the ZPC. If only the ZPC binds, then the problem is equivalent to
the unconstrained one, but in that case the optimal contract associated with higher i (lower i)
is always preferred by all j < i, thus the IC is violated. If one IC(j; i) binds but not the ZPC,
then by the sorting condition we can pick a couple (w; ) 2 B"((wip ; ip )) such that the ZPC
still holds and both types i and j are strictly better o, thus that is not a solution.
fPR1g is equivalent to the rst best problem
Follows from the previous results.
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There exists an unique solution to fPRig for all i > 1. At the optimum, only the
marginal IC is binding, IC(i  1; i).
We prove this iteratively.
First step. The solution for i = 1 is the rst best allocation: Z1p = Z1r , 1p = 1r and
w1p = w1r .
Iterative step. Consider the problem PRi for type i > 1. We go through two sub-steps.
i Assume rst that only the marginal IC is binding, IC(i  1; i). By the previous analysis, this
must be the case, in particular, for i = 2. The constrained optimum Zip , market tightness ip
and rent wip must satisfy the ZPC and IC(i   1; i). Thus, ip and wip satisfy the following
non-linear system in  and w:
X(i; w; ) = H
Zr(i 1; w; ) = Z(i 1)p
We can express w as a function of  in both equations:
w = wzpc(i; ) =

1 +
+ i


H (7)
w = wicc(i 1; ) = h 

1 +
+ i 1
=

Z(i 1)p (8)
Equation (8) is the indierence curve of type (i   1) that by construction goes through the
optimal point (
(i 1)
p ; w
(i 1)
p ). Moreover, at (
(i 1)
p ; w
(i 1)
p ) landlords make zero prots in the
market for type (i   1), thus they make strictly positive prots with households of type i. It
implies that, at 
(i 1)
p , the zero prot curve in the market for type i (7) is met for a lower value
of the rent, w < w
(i 1)
p . Thus:
wzpc(i; 
(i 1)
p ) < wicc(i 1; 
(i 1)
p )
At the limit, wzpc > wicc:
lim
zp!0
wzp =1 > h  Z1r = lim
ic!0
wic
lim
zp!1
wzp = H >  1 = lim
ic!1
wic
Thus, they cross at least twice, one time on the left and one time on the right of the point
(
(i 1)
p ; w
(i 1)
p ).
It is easy to show that:
Result 5. The expected value of a type i increases as  increases on the indierence curve of
a type j, with i > j (i < j), and viceversa; moreover, the two types have the same expected
values at  = 0.
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Intuitively, a higher market tightness aects more the type with higher moving probability.
This implies that the expected value of type i is maximized at the crossing point with higher 
and lower w, and it is higher than the optimal expected value of type (i  1):
ip > 
(i 1)
p
wip < w
(i 1)
p
Zip > Z
(i 1)
p
This solves the problem for i = 2.
(ii) In general, we need to show that no other IC(i  k; i) binds, with i > 2 and k > 1. Suppose
by way of contradiction that it does bind. We can assume, from substep (i), that (only) the
marginal incentive compatibility constraints bind for all j < i, in particular IC(i  k; i  k+1).
Thus, type (i   k) is indierent between the pairs ((i k)p ; w(i k)p ), ((i k+1)p ; w(i k+1)p ) and
(ip ; wip ). Since the pair (
(i k+1)
p ; w
(i k+1)
p ) is feasible for type i (the zero prot condition for
type i is not binding), by result 5 type i chooses optimally a higher  and lower w:
ip > 
(i k+1)
p > 
(i k)
p
wip < w
(i k+1)
p < w
(i k)
p
But then, by the same argument, type (i k+1) would prefer (ip ; wip ) to ((i k+1)p ; w(i k+1)p ),
violating the incentive compatibility constraint IC(i  k + 1; i). Thus (ip ; wip ) is not incentive
compatible. A contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is divided into two main parts. Part (1) proves that, if an allocation solves (PR),
then there exists a competitive search equilibrium with that allocation. Part (2) proves that any
equilibrium allocation solves (PR). From Proposition 3, it follows that the equilibrium exists
and is unique.
Part (1)
The proof is by construction. Let fwip ; ip gI be a solution to the (PR) problem. Construct the
candidate equilibrium allocation as follows:
Zip = Zr(i; w
i
p ; 
i
p ) 8i
W p = fwip gI
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Let the functions p and 	 be dened over the entire set [H; h] as follows:
p(w) :
(p(w))
p(w)
= min
j2I

h  w
Zjp
  1
 1
(+ j)
 k(w) = 1 implies k = argmin
j2I

h  w
Zjp
  1
 1
(+ j)
If there is more than one solution k that minimizes that equation, choose the largest one. The
denition of the function 	(w) then implies  j(w

i ) = 0 for all j 6= k. The expression for Zip
implies:
p(w
i
p ) = 
i
p 8wip 2W p
 i(w
i
p ) = 1 8wip 2W p
The rst equation is derived by noting that if the expression is minimized for j 6= i, then j
strictly prefers the i-optimal contract to the j-optimal contract, a contradiction. The second
equation follows, noting that, by the properties of the constrained optimum, the equation is
minimized by i and (i  1) only. Finally, the measure of landlords posting wip is consistent with
market tightness (wip ):
(wip ) =
 i
p(wip ) +
(p(wip ))
i
8wip 2W p
and (w) = 0 if w =2W p .
We prove that this allocation satises all the equilibrium conditions:
(i) Landlords' prot maximization and free entry.
By construction, the ZPC holds with equality 8w 2 W p . Consider w =2 W p , w 2 [H; h] and
assume, by contradiction: 
1 +

l(

p(w))
X
i2I
 i(w)
+ i
 1 1
w > H
This implies p(w) > 0 and there exists j with  j(w) > 0 and
1 +
+ j
l(p(w))
 1
w > H
By construction of 	(w),  j(w) = 1 and  k(w) = 0 8k 6= j. Then, by construction of (w):
(p(w))
p(w)
=

h  w
Zjp
  1
 1
(+ j) 

h  w
Zkp
  1
 1
(+ k) 8k
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And the inequality holds strictly for all k > j.
So, the couple (w; p(w)) satises all the constraints of the problem (Pj) and guarantees the
optimal value Zjp to j and strictly positive prots to landlords. By continuity and the sorting
condition, there exists a couple (w0; 0) 2 B"(w; p(w)), with w0 < w and 0 > p(w) such that
Zr(j ; w
0; 0) > Zjp and the ZPC and IC's are satised. A contradiction.
(ii) Households' optimal search.
By construction, Zip = maxw2W p Zr(i; w; 

p(w)), 

p(w
i
p ) > 0 and  i(w
i
p ) > 0. Moreover, by
the construction of p(w), for all w 2 [H; h], Zip  1
l(

p(w))
p(w)(+i)+l(p(w))
(h  w).
(iii) Market clearing.
Follows directly by construction.
Part (2)
Part (i) of the equilibrium denition implies that p(w) > 0 for all w 2 W p , and part (iii)
implies that for each i 9 w 2 W p such that  i(w) > 0. It follows that, 8i, 9 w 2 W p such that
p(w) > 0 and  i(w) > 0, thus from condition (ii) Zr(i; w; p(w)) = Zip .
We go through four steps to show that the equilibrium allocation solves the constrained maxi-
mization problem Pi, for all i:
(i) The ZPC is satised.
Let wip 2 W p and ip  p(wip ), with  i(wip ) > 0. Suppose by contradiction that the ZPC is
not satised: 
1 +
+ i
l(ip )
 1
wip < H
Then, by equilibrium condition (i) and by noting that expected prots are decreasing in , there
exists a k > i such that: 
1 +
+ k
l(ip )
 1
wip < H
By the sorting condition, 9 (0; w0) 2 B", with 0 >  and w0 < w s.th.:
Zr(j ; w
0; 0) > Zr(j ; wip ; 
i
p ) 8j  k
Zr(j ; w
0; 0) < Zr(j ; wip ; 
i
p ) 8j < k
Thus, for all j < k, Zr(j ; w
0; 0) < Zr(j ; wip ; ip )  Zjp by equilibrium condition (ii). But
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then condition (ii) and 0 > 0 imply  j(w0) = 0, 8 j < k. It follows:
1 +

l(
0)
X
i2I
 i(w
0)
+ i
 1 1
w0 

1 +
+ h
l(0)
 1
w0 > H
where the last inequality holds for " small enough. Thus, (w0; 0) is a protable deviation for
the landlord. A contradiction.
(ii) IC's are satised.
Consider again wip 2 W p , ip  p(wip ) > 0 and  i(wip ) > 0. By equilibrium condition (ii),
applied to all types j, it must be that:
Zr(j ; w
i
p ; 
i
p )  Zjp 8j
Thus, the incentive compatibility constraints IC(j; i) are satised 8j.
(iii) The equilibrium value is equal to Zip , as dened in equilibrium condition (ii).
Again, it follows directly from condition (ii), since p(wip ) > 0 and  i(wip ) > 0.
(iv) The equilibrium allocation solves Pi.
Let Zir be the value from the competitive equilibrium allocation for each i. Suppose there exists
a (w; ) which respects the constraints for PRi and is better: Xr(w; )  H, Zr(i; w; ) > Zir
and Zr(j ; w; )  Zjr for j < i.
Take w0 2 B(w) such that Xr(w0; ) > Xr(w; ), Zr(i; w0; ) > Zir and Zr(j ; w0; )  Zjr for
j < i. There exists a B0(w
0; ) such that for all (w^; ^) 2 B0(w0; ), Xr(w^; ^) > Xr(w; ) and
Zr(i; w^; ^) > Z
i
r.
By sorting (relative to (w0; )), there exists (w00; ~) 2 B0(w0; ) such that Zr(i; w00; ~) > Zir and
Zr(j ; w
00; ~) < Zjr for j < i. Note that w00 < w0 and ~ > .
The equilibrium  for the rent w00 according to the competitive equilibrium: p(w00)  ~. So
Zr(j ; w
00; p(w00)) < Z
j
r for j < i and Xr(w
00; p(w00))  Xr(w00; ~)  Xr(w0; ) > H. So the
allocation which gave Zir was not an equilibrium allocation.
Proof of Result 2
Start from the two equations for the constrained optimum and write them in -form:
w(i+1  ) =

1 +
+ i+1  
(i+1  )

H
w(i+1  ) = h 

1 +
+ i+1
(i+1  )=(i+1  )

Z(i+1)p
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where (i+1   ) = ((i+1   )). We can then derive (dropping the subscripts i + 1 and
using the notation h = =):
w()  w(  )

=
H
(  )  
()  (  )

+ 
()(  )H
w()  w(  )

=
(+ )Zp
h()h(  )
h()  h(  )

Taking lim!0 and rearranging:
@w
@
=
H


1  "
@
@

(+ )

@w
@
=  (+ )(1  ")
@
@

Zp
Solving for 0 and w0:
@
@
=   1
+ 

(1  ")Z
(i+1)
p
H
  "

 1
@w
@
=
(1  ")Zp


(1  ")Z

p
H
  "

 1
Thus:
@w
@
=  (+ )1  "

Zp < 0
p is increasing in  implies:
Zp >
1
p
"
1  "H
@p
@
< 0 8 < I
@wp
@
> 0 8 < I
They go to 1 for  = I . @w=@ at the border is well dened:
@wp
@p
=  (+ ) "
Ip (Ip )
H for  = I
Proof of Result 3
Dene:
A = (+ ) + 
B =

+ 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The value of searching in owning market Zo and in the renting market with public information
Zr (after plugging in the rms' zero prot condition) can be expressed as follows:
Zr = A
 1(h  H)  (+ )H
Zo = (A+B)
 1(h  H)  (+ )H
Thus, Zr > Zo for any value of . It follows immediately that the optimal value in the renting
market with public information is higher than the one in the owning market: Zr > Zo .
The FOCs of the two problems are respectively:
h
H
= 1 +
+ 
r

1  "
"A
 1
h
H
= 1 +
+ 
o

1  "
"A+B
 1
where "A and "A+B are the elasticities with respect to  of A and A+B, respectively. Moreover:
"A+B =
A
A+B
"A +
B
A+B
"B
And:
"A  A
0
A
=
(+ ) + "
(+ ) + 
2 (0; 1)
"B  B
0
B
= " 2 (0; 1)
The FOC are necessary (since  = 0 or  =1 is never optimal for  > 0), so at the optimum
o , "A+B > ". Also, for all , "A > " and " > "B. So "A > "A+B.
To show that the RHS of both FOCs are decreasing in , notice that:
"A = 1  (1  ")

1 +
+ 
h
 1
A
A+B
=

1 +

+ 

1 +
+ 
h
 1 1
@"A+B
@
=
@"A
@
A
A+B
+
@( AA+B )
@
("A   "B)
Staring at the expressions for "A and A=(A+B), it is easy to show that they are both increasing
in .23 This in turn implies that "A+B is increasing in  as well:
@"A
@
> 0
@"A+B
@
> 0
23"A is a negative function of h, that in turn is a negative function of . A=(A+B) is given by the inverse of
the product of two functions: one is a negative function of  and thus of , the other is a positive function of h
and thus a negative function of . As a result, the inverse is a negative function of .
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Thus the RHS of the two FOCs, say RHSr and RHSo, are decreasing in  (as the product of two
decreasing functions in ). But since "A+B < "A:
RHSo > RHSr 8
@RHSi
@
< 0
The condition RHSo(

o) = RHSr(

r) implies that 

o < 

r .
Furthermore, rearranging the FOC for owning and dierentiating,
H
h  H d =

0o(1 
"
"A+B
) + "o
d"A+B
d
1
"2A+B

d
From the FOC for owning, we know that ""A+B < 1 (otherwise 

o < 0). So
do
d > 0. Using
the envelope condition,
d ~Zo
d
=
@ ~Zo
@
=  Zo

H
Co
+
o +
o
+o
Ao +Bo

(9)
where Co = (h  H)  (+ )H.
The proof that
d ~Zp
d >
dZr
d is as follows: For any given ~ 2  , dene the constant k 
Zr (~)   ~Zp(~). Note that the function Zr   k = ~Zp at ~ and d(Z

r k)
d =
dZr
d . Also, 8 >
0; Zr (~  )  k > ~Zp(~  ).
Finally, dZ

o
d is continuous in . Since Z

o < Z

r 8 > 0 and Zo(0) = Zr(0), continuity of the
rst derivative guarantees that there exists a ~ such that, for all  < ~, dZ

o
d <
dZr
d . This means
that there is at most one crossing point between Zo and ~Zp on the interval (0; ~] and that they
denitely cross here if they haven't crossed before.
Proof of Result 4
From the rst-order conditions for renting with and without customization, respectively:
dr
d
=

"(+ )
r
+
"l(

r)
(r)2
 1
dcr
d
=

"(+ )
cr
+
"l(

cr)
(cr)2
 1
Suppose there exists a ~i such that Z~icr = Z
~i
r . Then 
~i
cr = 
~i
r and (with slight abuse of
notation) d
~i
r
d <
d~icr
d . Thus 

r() and 

cr() can cross at most once.
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Figure 1: Market tightness (queue length)
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Figure 2: Flow rent
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Figure 3: Expected value of searching in all markets
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Figure 4: Market tightness with and without rent control (queue length)
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Figure 5: Flow rent with and without rent control
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Figure 6: Expected value of searching in all markets with and without rent control
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Figure 7: Flow value for renting with private information and option to customize
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Figure 8: Market tightness (queue length) for renting with private information and option to
customize
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Figure 9: Flow value of search with all choices
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Figure 10: Market tightness (queue length) with all choices
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Figure 11: Rent with all choices
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